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JOHN W. GILL et al., Appellants, v. THE CURTIS PUBLISHING COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[1] Pleading-Motion for Judgment on Pleadings.-On appeal
from a judgment for defendants on the pleadings, the case
is reviewed as would be a judgment of dismissal entered following the sustaining of a general demurrer, and the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true, and so taken,
the question is whether a cause of action has been stated.
[2] Privacy-Nature of Right.-Right of privacy is recognized
independently of the common rights of property, contract,
reputation and physical integrity; it is the right to live one's
life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted
and undesired publicity, or simply the right to be let alone.
[3] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Difficulty in defiiJing boundaries of right of privacy, as applied in the publication field, is inherent in the necessity of balancing the public
interest in the dissemination of news, information and education, against the individual's interest in peace of mind and
freedom from emotional disturbances; and factors deserving
t'onsideration may include the medium of publication, the
extent of the use, the public interest served by the publication, and the seriousness of interference with the person's
privacy.
[4] !d.-Invasion of Right-Publication of Photograph.-Assuming that a magazine article treating of various types of love
is within the range of public interest in dissemination of
news, information or education, and in a medium which would
not be classified .as commercial, the public interest does not
require the use of any particular person's likeness in connection with such article without his consent, and t<> publish, as an illustration, an unauthorized photograph of a
husband and wife in such a manner as to indicate that their
only interest in each other is sex may impinge seriously on
their sensibilities and thus constitute an invasion of their
privacy.
[5] !d.-Standard by Which Right is to be Measured.-If the test
by which the right of privacy is to be measured is that which
[1] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 163; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 335.
[2] Right of privacy, notes, 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 456;
14 A.L.R. (2) 750. See, also, Cal.Jur., Privacy; Am.Jur., Privacy, §§ 2, 5, 9.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 243(1); [2-8] Privacy.
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would disturb the sensibilities of an ordinary person, then
it is a question for the trier of fact rather than one of
law whether the publication of a picture of a husband and
wife in an amorous pose would outrage or injure the fpelings of an ordinary couple.
[6] !d.-Waiver or Loss of Right.-Fact that a business operated by husband and wife is well known throughout the
world does not create a legitimate and overriding public
interest so that a photograph taken of them in an amorou:;
pose at their place of business would constitute a wainn·
of privacy as regards the unauthorized publieation of such
photograph, where the magazine article in which such photograph is used is not aimed at giving newB or information
about the business.
[7] Id.-Pleading.-Complaint hy husband and wife that, in disregard of their feelings and rights, an individual dPfendant
photographed them in an amorous pose at their place of business without their knowledge or consent, and that thrJ photograph was used to illustrate a magazine article treating· oE
various types of love in such a manner as to depict plaintiffs as dissolute and immoral persons and to rob them of
public esteem, states a cause of action for invasion of privacy without specifically alleging that they suffered mental
distress, since it may be inferred from the facts alleged that
their feelings were hurt and that they suffered mental anguish.
[8] Id.-Pleading.-Allegation in a complaint that publieation oi'
a photograph of husband and wife in an amorous posP depicts them as dissolute persons and holds them up to publie
scorn and ridicule is not objectionable as stating conclusions
of law, where such photograph and the magazine article with
which it was published are attached to the complaint and
they are susceptible to the construction placed thereon by
plaintiffs.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, ,Judge. Reversed.
Aetion for damages for invasion of pnvaey.
for defendants on pleadings, reversed.

,Judgment

Shaelmove & Goldman and Ben F. Goldman, Jr., for Appellants.
MaeDonald & Pettit and Thomas H. McGovern for Respondents.
Loeb & Loeb, as Amiei Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
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CAH/FB~H, .T.-·-[1] ~\ jmlgment. on the pleading8 for defendants, Curtis Publishing Company and Curtis Circulation
Company, was granted pursuant to defendants' motion. 'l'he
ease is reviewed, therefore, the same as would be a judgment
of dismissal entered following the sustaining of a general
demurrer, and the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint must
be taken as true, and so taken the question is whether' a cause
of action has been stated. (Rannard v. Lockheed Ai1·cra{t
Corp., 26 Cal.2d 149 [157 P.2d 1]; Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal.2d
409 [115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291]; 21 Cal.Jur. 234 et seq.)
Plaintiffs are husband and wife. Defendants publish, circulate and sell for profit a monthly magazine named Ladie.;'
Home ,J onrnal. Cartier-Bresson, a photographer, and Dahl,
a writer, are in the employ of defendants.
Plaintiffs own and operate a confectionary and ice cream
eoncession in the Farmers' Market in Los Angeles. They
have a reputation for industry, integrity, decency and morality. Cartier-Bresson, in the course of his employment, photog'l'aphecl plaintiffs at their place of business ·without their
knowledge or consent. The photograph depicts them apparently seated on stools side by side at the patron's side of
the counter at their concession; plaintiff, Mr. Gill, has his
ann around his wife and is leaning forward with his cheek
against hers. The picture was published by defendants in
their May, 1949, issue of the Ladies' Home Journal, in conneetion with an artiele entitled "Love" ·written by Dahl in
the course of lJis employment. Under the picture appears
the caption "Publicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love at
first sight' is a bad risk.'' 'l'he article is a somewhat philosophical and sociological discussion of love between the opposite sexes and its relation to divorce. Love is classified
generally on the basis of the extent it is founded upon "sex
attraction" or "affection" and "respect." One of the classifications is called love at first sight, which is founded upon
100 per cent sex attraction, the kind which the photograph
i;;; c·aptionecl to portray. That kind of love is called the
"wrong" one, not lasting and will be followed by divorce. In
this connection, plaintiffs allege that the picture depicts them
''in such a manner as to indicate said plaintiffs are loos-e,
dissolute and immoral persons engaged in the so-called 'wrong
kind of loye' . . . ''
Defendants knew, or should have known, it is further
asserted, plaintiffs were happily married and had a high
moral reputation, but nevertheless, in a malicious disregard
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of their rig·hts and feelings, published and sold the magazine
with the article and photograph; that such publication and
distribution caused plaintiffs to be held up to public "scorn,
ridicule, hatred, contempt and obloquy and did rob and
deprive plaintiffs of the benefits of public confidence, respect
and esteem and injure said plaintiffs in their business and
social contacts and associations and in their reputations and
health'' to their damage in the sum of $200,000.
[2] Hecognition has been given of a right of privacy, independent of the common rights of property, contract, reputation and physical integrity, generally described as "the right
to live one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity. In short it is the right
to be let alone." (Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 285, 289 [297
P. 91] .) Remedies have been afforded for the protection of
that right. (See Melvin v. Reid, sttpra; Cohen v. Marx, 94
Cal.App.2cl 704 [211 P.2d 320] ; Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner, 35 Cal.App.2cl 304 [95 P.2d 491] ; Kerby v. Hal
Roach Studios, 53 Cal.App.2d 207 [127 P.2d 577] ; Reed v.
Real Detective Pt~b. Co., 63 Ariz. 294 [162 P.2cl 133] ; Smith
v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250 [37 So.2d 118] ; Cason v. Baskin, 155
Pla. 198 [20 So.2d 243]; Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64
P. 280 [31 L.R.A. 283]; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 122 Ga.190 [50 S.E. 68]; Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,
171 Ga. 257 [155 S.E. 194]; Goodyear Tire & Rttbber Co. v.
Vandergriff, 52 Ga.App. 662 [184 S.E. 452]; McDaniel v.
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.App. 92 [2 S.E.2d
811]; Sikes v. Foster, 74 Ga.App. 350 [39 S.E.2cl 585]; Sidis
v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 P.2d 806, dealing with California,
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky and Missouri law; Paramount
Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 P.Supp. 1004; State
ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Incl. 364 [66 N.E.2d 755] ;
I[unz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883 [172 P. 532, L.R.A. 1918D 1151];
Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227 [18 S.W.2d 972];
Itzkovich v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479 [39 So. 499, 112 Am.St.
Rep. 272, 1 L.R.A.N.S. 1147] ; Pallas v. Crowley Milner & Co.,
322 Mich. 411 [33 N.W.2d 911] ; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo.
App. 652 [134 S.W. 1076] ; Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo.
1199 [159 S.W.2d 291]; F'lake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780 [195 S.E. 55] ; Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64
Nev. 38 [177 P.2d 442]; McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J.Eq.
24 [43 A.2d 514]; Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J.Misc. 633
[16 A.2cl 80] ; Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482
[113 P.2d 438] ; Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virgin,ia, 192
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S.C. 454 [7 S.E.2d 169, 127 A.L.R. 110]; Rest., Torts, § 867;
37 Va.L.Rev., 335; 22 So.Cal.L.Rev. 320; 48 Columb.L.Rev.,
713; 4 Harv.L.Rev., 193; 41 Am.Jur., Privacy, § 5; 138
A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446; 14 A.L.R.2d 750.) There are
more states which have recognized such a right than have not,
and the former represent the modern trend. (See cases
collected 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446; 14 A.L.R.2d 750;
40 Columb.L.Rev. 713.) The arguments advanced by the
authorities pro and con are summarized: ''One of the principal arguments advanced in support of the doctrine of privacy by its original exponents is that the increased complexity
and intensity of modern civilization and the development of
man's spiritual sensibilities have rendered man more sensitive
to publicity and have increased his need of privacy, while
the great technological improvements in the means of communication have more and more subjected the intimacies of
his private life to exploitation by those who pander to commercialism and to prurient and idle curiosity. A legally
enforceable right of privacy is deemed to be a proper protection against this type of encroachment upon the personality
of the individual. While the early law gave redress only for
physical interference with life and property, it is now recognized that man's spiritual nature also needs protection, and
that his feelings as well as his limbs should be inviolate. In
the formative period of the common law, before the day of
newspapers, radio, and photography, when life was simpler
and human relations more direct, the individual could himself
adequately protect his privacy. Today this would be impossible, and to cast the individual upon his own resources
in this regard would only result in a relapse into a system
of private vengeance and violence which our civilization has
outgrown. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press have
been urged as a ground for denying the existence of the
right of privacy. The right of privacy does undoubtedly
infringe upon absolute freedom of speech and of the press,
and it also clashes with the interest of the public in having
a free dissemination of news and information. These para~
mount public interests must be taken into account in placing
the necessary limitations upon the right of privacy. But if
this right of the individual is not without qualifications,
neither is freedom of speech and of the press unlimited. The
latter privilege is subject to the qualification that it shall not
be so exercised as to abuse the rights of individuals. Accordingly, it is held by courts recognizing the right of privacy
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that the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
of the press do not warrant the publication of matter constituting an invasion of the right of privacy any more than
they give the right to defame a person. 'l'he absence of precedent affirming the existence of the right of privacy has been
stressed by the courts denying or doubting the existence of
such a right. This was one of the principal grounds of the
first decision repudiating the doctrine of privacy. But the
courts adopting the other view take the position that the lack
of specific precedent is not decisive. It has been objected
that a recognition of the right of privacy would open up a
vast field of litigation, some of it bordering on the absurd.
But courts recog·nizing the right deny the validity of this
objection. According to the latter view, the fact that a recognition of the right would involve many cases near the border
line, and would present perplexing questions, is not a good
ground for denying the existence of such right or refusing·
to give relief in a case where it is clearly shown that a legal
wrong has been done. -While it is clear that when dealing with
injuries to feelings alone it is difficult to fix definite and
practical limits separating that which is merely a trivial
annoyance to a particular individual from that of which the
law will take cognizance, the difficulty is not insurmountable.
The supposed principle of law that remedies are not afforded
for mental pain or distress or injuries to the sensibilities,
where there is no other injury involved, has been asserted as
an argument against the right of privacy." ( 41 Am.Jur.,
Privacy, § 9.)
vVe believe the reasons in favor of the right are persuasive,
especially in the light of the declaration by this court that
''concepts of the sanctity of personal rights are specifically
protected by the Constitutions, both state and federal, and
the courts have properly given them a place of high dignity,
and worthy of especial protection." (Orloff v. Los Angeles
Tm·f Club, 30 Cal.2cl110, 117 [180 P.2d 321, 171 A.L.R. 913].)
[3] The difficulty in defining the boundaries of the right,
as applied in the publication field, is inherent in the necessity
of balancing the public interest in the dissemination of news,
information and education against the individuals' interest
in peace of mind and freedom from emotional disturbances.
vVhen words relating to or actual pictures of a person or his
name are published, the circumstances may indicate that
public interest -is predominant. Factors deserving consideration may include the medium of publication, the extent of
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the use, the pnblie interest served by the publication, and
the seriousness of the interference with the person's privacy.
In the instant case, it is not necessary to decide whether the
article accompanying the photograph is news or information
such as the public interest demands. It might be described
as a nonfictional pseudopsychological or sociological discussion. [4] Assuming it to be within the range of public interest
in dissemination of news, information or education, and in
a medium that would not be classed as commercial-for profit
or advertising-there appears no necessity for the use in connection with the article without their consent, of a photograph
of plaintiffs. The article, to fulfill its purpose and satisfy the
public interest, if any, in the subject matter discussed, could,
possibly, stand alone without any picture. In any event, the
public interest did not require the use of any particular
person's likeness nor that of plaintiffs without their consent.
'rhe likeness is only illustrative of a part of the article, like
a schematic diagram in a scientific dissertation, except that
there is far less necessary pertinency. On the other hand,
the impact on plaintiffs has been as alleged, and it is apparent
from the article and caption under the picture, that they are
depicted as persons whose only interest in each other is sex,
a characterization that may be said to impinge seriously upon
their sensibilities.
In Melvin v. Reid, stlpra, 112 Cal.App. 285, defendant exhibited a motion picture depicting degrading :incidents in
plaintiff's past life, using her maiden name, when she had
reformed for eight years. It was held that such incidents as
occurred during her trial for murder, being part of a public
record, were clothed with a public interest, but that it was
"unnecessary" to use her name in connection with other incidents in her life. On the other hand, in Metter v. Los Angeles
E.xarniner, stlpra, 35 Cal.App.2d 304, the court felt the public
interest in the news of a suicide by a woman from a downtown business building resulting in a news story and photograph of her overshadowed the invasion, if any, of her
husband's right of privacy. The court found liability in Kerby
v. Hal Roach Sttlclios, sttpm, 53 Cal.App.2d 207, where an
actress' name was signed to advertising material, consisting
of a questionable letter, concerning a motion picture in which
she did not have a part, pointing out that the publicity arising
from her position as an actress did not justify the invasion.
Cohen v. Marx, s~tpra, 94 Cal.App.2d 704, turned upon the
legitimate public interest in a public prize fighter.
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Defendants urge, however, that there is not a suillciently
serious invasion of plaintiffs' privacy. In that connection,
they refer to the Restatement where the right is stated: ''A
person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or
his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
(Rest., Torts, § 867.) "The rule stated in this Section gives
protection to the interest which a person has in living with
some privacy, but this protection is relative to the customs
of the time and place and to the habits and occupation of
the plaintiff. One who is not a recluse must expect the ordinary incidents of community life of which he is a part. These
include comment upon his conduct, the more or less casual
observation of his neighbors as to what he does upon his own
land and the possibility that he may be photographed as a
part of a street scene or a group of persons. . . . On the other
hand, liability exists only if the defendant's conduct was
such that he should have realized that it would be offensive
to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability
accrues. These limits are exceeded where intimate details of
the life of one who has never manifested a desire to have
publicity are exposed to the public, or where photographs of
a person in an embarrasing pose are surreptitiously taken and
published. . . . In determining liability, the knowledge and
motives of the defendant, the sex, station in life, previous
habits of the plaintiff with reference to publicity, and other
similar matters are considered. A distinction can be made in
favor of news items and against advertising use.'' (Rest.,
Torts, § 867, comments C & D.) We have seen that the caption under the picture describes it as "love at first sight"
and the article says such love is based on 100 per cent sex.
It is not unreasonable to believe such would be seriously
humiliat~ng and disturbing to plaintiffs' sensibilities, and it is
so alleged, especially when we consider it deals with the intimate and private relationship between the opposite sexes
and marriage. [5] If the test is, as defendants claim, what
an ordinary man would consider such, then it is a question
for the trier of fact rather than one of law.
[6] Defendants rely upon cases where through their own
acts or by an incident thrust upon them, a person's affairs
became of public interest and he cannot recover for the
publicity given; that they have waived their right of privacy.
\Ve have seen, however, that there was no legitimate interest
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in using plaintiffs' likenesses in this article, and it may be
added that there was no pressing need for speed which is
customarily a factor in disseminating news. It should be observed, that referring to the use of a person's likeness for
a legitimate public interest as not actionable because it indicates a waiver by the person of his right, is of doubtful
validity, for it has been applied whether the publication
having news value arose out of an incident of his own making
or involuntarily and without his fault thrust upon him. We
cannot agree that from the allegation in the complaint that
plaintiffs' business is well known to persons throughout the
world, puts the case within the category of legitimate and
overriding public interest, for the article, and use of the
photograph with it, was not aimed at giving news or information about plaintiffs' business.
The article may be interpreted as not dealing with actual
recent or past events in the lives of actual persons. It is more
a philosophical or psychological or semi-educational discussion of abstractions. Hence, such cases as S1'dis v. F-R Pub.
Corp., supra, 113 F.2d 806, dealing with the later career of a
once infant prodigy, under a "Where Are They Now" heading,
are not in point. Cases from New York are of little assistance,
for there the court of appeals rejected the existence of a right
of privacy and a statute which was passed creating the right
limited it to the use of a person's name, picture or portrait
"for advertising purposes, or purposes of trade." (See Sarat
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776 [295 N.Y.S. 382].)
[7] Plaintiffs do not allege that their right of privacy was
invaded or that they suffered mental distress, assert defendants, and thus no cause of action is stated. Plainly the
complaint alleges facts which clearly show a violation of
plaintiffs' right of privacy. More is not necessary. It is
alleged that in disregard of plaintiffs' feelings and rights the
publication was made ; that the article depicted plaintiffs as
dissolute and immoral persons and robbed them of public
esteem; that by reason of the acts alleged, plaintiffs were
damaged in the sum of $200,000. We think that it may be at
least inferred therefrom that their feelings were hurt and
they suffered mental anguish. The proceeding is, as heretofore
stated, to be treated as though a general demurrer had been
sustained. So treated, the complaint states a cause of action.
(Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal.2d 654 [204 P.2d 1, 7 A.L.R.2d696] .)
[8] It is said the allegation that the publication depicts
plaintiffs as dissolute persons and holds them up to public
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scorn and ridicule are conclusions of law. vVe do not thin ~
so, The published article and likeness are attached to the
complaint, and as seen from the foregoing discussion, they ~,re
susceptible of the construction placed thereon by plaintifs.
Judgment reversed.
1

Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.

[Sac. No. 6082. In Bank. Jan. 18, 1952.]

CHARLES lVL COOKE et al., Respondents, v. ANTONIO
RAMPONI et al., Appellants.
[1] Licenses-In Real Property-Irrevocable Licenses.-Where a
licensee has entered on the land of another under a parol
license and has expended money or its equivalent in labor
in execution of the license, the license becomes irrevocable,
the licensee will have a right of entry on the land for the
purpose of maintaining his structures or his rights under the
license, and the license will continue for so long a time as the
nature of it calls for.
[2] Id.-In Real Property-Irrevocable Licenses.-Principal basis
for view as to irrevocability of a license where licensee has
entered on land of licensor for certain purposes is the doctrine
of equitable estoppel; the license, similar in its essentials to
an easement, is declared to be irrevocable to prevent the
licensor from perpetrating a fraud on the licensee.
[3] Estoppel-Against State.-Doctrine of estoppel may, in exceptional circumstances, be applied in favor of a private person
against the state or its agencies.
[4] !d.-Against State.-Judgment decreeing plaintiffs' ownership
of an easement over defendants' land need not rest on theory
of estoppel against the state where the record establishes an
executed, irrevocable parol license in favor of plaintiffs as the
result of their respective agreements with the state'~ successors in interest, including defendants, and the mutual
performance of the parties thereunder.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 67; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 103.
[3] Application of doctrine of estoppel against government and
its governmental agencies, note, 1 A.L.R.2d 338. See, also, Cal.Jur.,
Estoppel, § 28; Am.Jur., Estoppel, § 166.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,5] Licenses, §70; [3,4] :mstoppel,
§ 44.

